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review itself, when granted, could and should recognize and take into account
the discretion allowed the trial judge. Under the present rule, granting review
invariably means granting reversal.
CONCLUSION

Under the common law system, review of a motion for a new trial was not
based on the distinction between error in law and error in fact, but on the
elementary concept of what was just to all concerned. It is unfortunate that
the federal courts did not adopt this informal practice. Although the old
English system cannot be established under the present federal practice, the
power of review of the issue of excessive damages should be returned to the
appellate court so that multiple protection can be guaranteed litigants.
The trend is toward liberalization. How far will it extend? There are two
roads open. Either the appellate courts will broaden review so that all rulings
on new trials will be reviewed, with reversal ordered where judicial abuse of discretion is evident, or the hesitancy concerning review of errors in fact will be
forgotten and direct examination of the jury verdict for abuse will be made.
The latter course would eliminate the circular approach that is commonly
employed. Although the traditional objections have been destroyed, in all
probability the trend toward more liberal review will follow the slow course
of judicial change.
STIPULATIONS OUSTING ADMIRALTY COURTS OF
JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION

Recently the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a decision of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the extent to which effect can be
given to stipulations in ocean bills of lading not to resort to the courts of this
country.' The Court ultimately declined to pass on this point when its resolution2
became unnecessary for an adequate determination of the rights of the parties.
The opinion dismissing the writ, however, suggests that given sufficient opportunity the Court will review the problem; one which has produced a disparity
of decision not only among the courts of appeals but even within particular
circuits.
THE CONFLICT OF DECISIONS
The clearest expression of the views of the Second Circuit is found in
William H. Mudler & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd.' There, a New York
1.
2.

The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 358 U.S. 809 (1958).
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959).

Inasmuch as the

Supreme Court was in agreement with the circuit court to the effect that the suit in rem
against the vessel was not prohibited by the jurisdictional stipulation, the question of

whether or not the suit against the owner of the vessel should be retained was only of
academic interest.
3.

224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
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corporation, consignee of certain goods shipped aboard a foreign vessel from
Sweden to Philadelphia, filed a libel in the Southern District of New York
against the Swedish owners of the ship. One term of the bill of lading
under which the shipment was forwarded provided that any claim against the
carrier was to be decided by the Swedish courts. Affirming the lower court in
dismissing the libel, the court of appeals stated that stipulations relegating
parties to foreign forums are valid unless unreasonable. Furthermore, once the
respondent shows the existence of the agreement, the libelant bears the burden
of proving that it is unreasonable.4 Although, in Swift & Co. v. Compania
ColorisbianaDel Caribe,5 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
citizen could not, on forum non conveniens principles, be relegated to a
foreign tribunal unless assured of adequate security and jurisdiction over the
other party, the M1 idler court affirmed dismissal of the suit before it without
providing for these safeguards. The court's action was consistent with its
prior holding in Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.AS., that
Swift does not apply to cases where the parties have voluntarily agreed to
submit to another forum.
The Second Circuit thus has recognized that a distinction must be drawn
between a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens and a
plea for the same relief on the basis of a contractual stipulation.7 In the
4. In Transcontinental Commodities, Inc. v. Italnavi Societa Di Navigazione Per AzioniGenova, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the libelant opposed a motion to dismis
on the ground that the bill of lading in question did not bind it and, therefore, the motion
would not lie. The court denied the motion on the ground that such a plea raised an
issue which could not be decided on motion papers.
5. 399 U.S. 684 (1950). "Application of forum non conveniens principles to a suit by
a United States citizen against a foreign respondent brings into force considerations very
different from those in suits between foreigners." Id. at 697.
6. 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
7. In Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, OA.S., supra note 6, Judge Clark,
in a concurring opinion, indicates quite clearly that there is a distinction to be drawn.
,U prefer to place my concurrence upon the validity, under the circumstances here dclosed,
of the contract requiring all claims to be settled in Norway. The apparently wider discretion
granted in the opinion to the district judge to pass upon the appropriateness of the forum
'
may, perhaps, raise more extensive questions which we need not now face. Id. at 990-91.
However, district courts within the Second Circuit have failed to recognize the distinction.
See Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Murillo, Ltd. v. The Bio
Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Republica De Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In The
Tricolor, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1932), the lower court
declined jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. A jurisdictional clause rele ating
the parties to a foreign forum was considered by the court as one of the elements
determinative of the forum non conveniens issue. Other lower court decisions have
recognized the distinction which exists between the two motions. Transcontinental Conmodities, Inc. v. Italnavi Societa Di Navigazione Per Azioni-Genova, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas.
939 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Export Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 115 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). By
confusing the two concepts, the courts have also injected into the problems surrounding
jurisdictional stipulations the irreconcilable decisions concerned with forum non conveniens.
Compare Guevara v. M.V. Rio Jachal, 1956 Am. Mar. Cas. 1301 (S.D/N.Y. 1956), with
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former case, a court will not dismiss unless the respondent can show "that he
will be unfairly prejudiced, unless it be removed to some other jurisdiction." 8
When there is an agreement to litigate in a foreign forum, the libelant must
introduce sufficient proof that the stipulation is unreasonable if jurisdiction is
to be retained. The same factors, such as availability of witnesses or the
ability of the foreign forum to adjudicate the matter fairly, 10 will determine
whether the stipulation is "unreasonable" or, on a forum non conveniens
motion, whether the respondent will be "unfairly prejudiced." Lacking a
stipulation, however, the respondent must show a balance strongly in his favor,
since a libelant's choice of forum is "rarely" to be disturbed."' Given the same
facts, but adding an agreement to submit all claims to a foreign tribunal, the
action will be dismissed unless the libelant can convince the court that certain
factors weigh heavily in its favor. The situation is analogous to the approach
of New York courts in actions between nonresidents. In commercial cases New
York courts will retain jurisdiction unless convinced by the defendant that he
will be prejudiced.' 2 In tort, the action will be dismissed unless the court is
persuaded to do otherwise
by factors weighing heavily in favor of the plaintiff's
3
choice of forum.'
In contrast to the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has stated that any consideration of a foreign forum
stipulation "starts with the universally accepted rule that agreements in
advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.' 4 The Fifth Circuit
distinguished Muller on factual grounds, but in reality there was a basically
different approach to the problem. This is borne out by the statement of the
court that the respondents "pitch their argument to a considerable extent upon
Nestle's Products (Malaya), Ltd. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisba, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas, 1590
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). In the former case, jurisdiction was declined on the basis of a suit
between two foreign parties based on a claim for damages sustained outside waters of
the United States. In the latter, the court blandly announced that the whole controversy
appears to have no connection with the United States, and then went on to retain jurisdiction.
8. The Western Farmer, 210 F.2d 754, 756 (2d Cir. 1954). Although this was a collision
case, there is no logical reason why the same principle should not be applied to a cargo
claim arising out of different circumstances. See Nestle's Products (Malaya), Ltd. v. Osaka
Shosen Kaisha, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
9. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932); The Western
Farmer, 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954).
10. Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
11. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
12. De Flammercourt v. Ascer, 3 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
13. Reep v. Butcher, 27 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
14. Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 180 (1959). The opinion is somewhat confusing inasmuch as the
court was aware of William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), and yet stated that the principle enunciated
is universally accepted. See also The Alabama, 1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 1766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
where the district court upheld the specific enforcement of an agreement to litigate in a
foreign forum.
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the doctrine of forum non conveniens, recognizing that... [the jurisdictional
stipulation] alone did not provide a firm basis upon which to stand2' 6 Both
circuits agree that a forum non conveniens defense will not succeed until the
respondent can show that he will be highly prejudiced unless the case is
dismissed. 16 The Fifth Circuit, by acknowledging that the defense of forum
non conveniens provides a sounder basis for dismissing an action rather than
a motion for the same relief on the ground of a jurisdictional agreement, dearly
indicated that such stipulations will be accorded little, if any, weight. Contrast
this with the position of the parties in the Second Circuit where, if the libelant
cannot demonstrate the unreasonableness of the stipulation, the respondent
need merely show the existence of the agreement to gain a dismissal.
In Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui,'7 a district court in the First Circuit
accepted the Muller case and carried it to a logical conclusion. There, the
subrogee of the consignee brought suit in the district where the goods had been
discharged. The court dismissed the action since the libelant was unable to
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the stipulation particularly in view of the
necessity of obtaining proof from Spain as to the actual condition of the goods
when shipped. The fact that it was also necessary to obtain evidence at the port
of discharge and that the consignee was actively engaged in business there, was
considered of little import. A district court' 8 in the Third Circuit, citing and
professing to accept Muller, nevertheless found the issue essentially the same
as forum non conveniens, and concluded that jurisdiction must be retained unless
the respondent could show that he was unreasonably prejudiced thereby.
Not only is there disparity between the circuits, but within the Second
Circuit itself, which handles a large percentage of the admiralty matters before
federal courts, there are conflicts. In Chemical Carriers,Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.'s
Internationale Sleepdienst,19 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York refused to dismiss an action between two foreign corporations despite
a jurisdictional clause in the towage contract. Muller was distinguished on
the ground that it did not require dismissal where the libelant would be
15. 254 F.2d at 301.
16. Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957). It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court because it had proceeded on the wrong principle when it took the approach
that jurisdiction would be retained over foreign parties as regards a collision on the high
seas only when good cause was shown for so doing. The correct forum non conveniens
principle is that jurisdiction will be retained unless the respondent can convince the court
that there is a strong balance of convenience in his favor dictating dismissal. Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
17. 171 F. Supp. 33 (D.P.R. 1959).
18. Sociedade Brasileira De Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltd. v. SS. Punta
Del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1955). There is an obvious departure from the principles
set forth in William L Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d E06 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), in that the New Jersey court requires the respondent to
prove prejudice under the doctrine of forum non conveniens which the Second Circuit has
recognized as an altogether different problem.
19. 154 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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deprived of his remedy if relegated to a foreign forum whose laws might bar
recovery. This very point had been discussed by the Second Circuit in The
Western Farmner,20 and it had dismissed lightly any contention that a variance
in remedy should influence a decision on a motion to dismiss. Commenting on
this aspect of the problem, a district court 2 ' in the Fifth Circuit noted that it
would be unreasonable to hold that American law on a particular subject
embodied the "quintessence of justice." Even were it assumed that our own
admiralty law should be applied in a given situation, jurisdiction cannot be
retained on this basis since it must also be assumed that a foreign court will
22
give effect to it.
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT

The libelant in the Muller case raised an objection to the jurisdictional stipulation on the ground that it'lessened the liability of the carrier otherwise than
as provided in Section 1303(8) of the Carriage'of Goods by Sea Act"3 and
was, therefore, violative of that Act. The argument was made that the convenience to the carrier and additional cost to the libelant-consignee involved
by litigation in Sweden, in effect minimized the liability of the carrier. The court
rejected this contention, holding that "such possible expense, which is only
incidental to the process of litigation, is [not]
enough to bring this jurisdictional
'
agreement within the ban of § 1303(8). 124
Although rejected by the Muller court, and properly so under the circumstances of the case, the contention that jurisdictional clauses may at times be
violative of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is well taken. This statute,
which by its terms is applicable to all contracts "for the carriage of goods by
sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade," 2r prohibits carriers
from contracting away their liability beyond certain specified limits and declares
void any clauses in a contract of carriage purporting to do mso.2 It would seem,
therefore, that if a jurisdictional stipulation relegates parties to a forum whose
law would relieve the carrier from liability in contravention of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, such agreement should be void. Had the Muller court found,
for example, that the Swedish courts do not apply the same measure of damages
as American maritime courts, there would have been a serious question as to
whether or not the carrier's liability had been lessened in violation of the Act,
and a different decision might have issued.
It is not uncommon for bills of lading to state that various statutes, which
conflict at least in part, are applicable to the same contract of carriage. If an
action involving a shipment within the purview of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act were dismissed in a United States court on the ground of a jurisdictional
20.

210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954).

21.

Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va.

1959).

22.

Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932).

23.
24.

49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1952).
244 F.2d at 807.

25.
26.

49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1952).
49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1952).
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clause, and the parties were relegated to a forum whose law was also applicable

to the contract by the terms of the bill of lading, it is hardly reasonable to
expect that the foreign court would apply our statute since, if the situation
were reversed, our own courts would be bound to apply the Carriage of Goods

by Sea Act.27 In such a case it is submitted that a United States court is
prohibited from enforcing a stipulation relegating the parties to the foreign
tribunal.
CONCLUSION

Excepting those rare occasions when an admiralty court may find itself
statutorily bound to retain jurisdiction, it appears that the principles set forth
in the Muller decision form a sound basis for dealing with the contractual stipulations relegating the parties to a foreign forum. The laws of other maritime
nations recognize the validity of such agreements and will enforce them.29 In
so doing they have realistically appraised the value of these stipulations and the
rights of parties to establish beforehand their liabilities and rights under a given
contract and also the legitimate interest of foreign nations in matters which
effect their maritime fleets.
Recently, in Romero v. Interntational Terminal Operating Co.20 the Supreme
Court, dealing with a choice of law problem in connection with a foreign seaman's claim, stated that in the absence of congressional direction those principles
must be applied which "are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law and with due recognition of our self-regarding respect for the relevant
interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime commerce as part of
the legitimate concern of the international community."Z' In this case the Court
declined to give the alien seaman the benefit of a United States statute governing the rights of seamen, holding that the applicable law was that of the flag
of the foreign vessel involved. The parties had by contract fixed the law by
which compensation was to be determined and it was held that to apply our own
law in derogation of this agreement would be to impose an "onerous" and
"unduly speculative burden" on the shipowner whose liability under such a
decision would shift from one standard to another as a vessel passed the
boundaries of territorial waters.
The preferring of one forum over another may effect liability to the same
extent as the choice of one law rather than another. In the Chemical Carrier's
case the court based its decision to retain jurisdiction primarily on the lack of
a remedy to the libelant if he were relegated to the foreign forum. Should not
27. The English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22, art. IV, § 5,
states that the carrier's liability shall not, unless otherwise stipulated, exceed £10 (appro.ximately $280). The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act has the same provision
except that the sum is $50D. 49 Stat. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1952). If the
parties were relegated to a forum which would apply the English Act in a case where a
package was damaged in excess of the above amounts, the carrier's liability would be
lessened within the intendment of the Act.
28. Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); The Alabama, 1952
Am. Afar. Cas. 1766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

29. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
30. Id. at 382-83.

